“Given the emphasis placed on open sources in the war in Ukraine, it’s easy to forget how much successful intelligence output can also depend on secrecy and even a little deception. Attributing Ukraine’s successes to open source can also offer a kind of cover for more closely held sources and methods,” says Rog.
British scholar Matthew Ford, co-author of a forthcoming book on the impact of information infrastructure and connected devices on conventional military conflicts, calls the phenomenon “radical warfare.”
Ford says the high level of mobile connectivity among Ukrainians and the noticeable lack of combat footage from smartphones and cameras, especially in the early phases of the war, suggest an effective information operation may be underway. “Undoubtedly, the Ukrainians fear that such images will reveal their tactics, techniques and procedures,” says Ford. So the Ukrainians might just be censoring themselves.
Social media platforms and mobile phones are also a force multiplier for traditionally weaker militaries such as Ukraine, especially when it comes to coordinating intelligence gathering for targeted activities. “The targeting information is now being exchanged online,” says Ford. “Successful kills were noted on Telegram. Chatbots have been created to help Ukrainians share destination coordinates with their smartphones. Target identification does not involve sophisticated military systems; works from civil information infrastructures.’
“The problem with mass intelligence in a war like Ukraine is the standardization of reporting,” says Ford. For example: “You want to be able to identify the vehicle, geo-locate it, then map all available signals or satellite imagery or other collection disciplines, combining them into useful targeting information.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not only the first conventional war of the 21st century in Europe, it is “the most digitally connected in history,” according to Ford. “If the Ukrainians can make this intelligence actionable faster than the Russians, they can use their limited long-range fires, artillery, drones and perhaps even missiles or air power effectively.” Therefore, the goal is to find, repair, and finish off Russian forces faster than the Russians can do it themselves.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in late February, the US, its allies and Russia concluded that Ukraine’s forces were at an asymmetrical disadvantage against Putin’s gifted and historically brutal counterpart. American officials expected the country to fall within days. Yet despite the U.S.’s monumental success in predicting Russia’s intentions and plans and offering warnings, U.S. intelligence agencies have misjudged the prospects for Ukraine, the current subject of internal review.
